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Empirical insights into corporate defamation: An analysis of cases decided 2004-2013. 
David J Acheson* 
Abstract 
This paper presents the results of a systematic analysis of all judgments handed down by the 
High Court, Court of Appeal, and House of Lords in defamation claims brought by corporate 
claimants between 2004 and 2013. The intention is to widen the range of methods with which 
to assess both common arguments for reforming corporate defamation law, and the ‘serious 
financial loss’ requirement imposed on most corporate claimants by s 1(2) of the Defamation 
Act 2013. 
The results of the study add weight to some of the arguments put forward in support of the 
removal of the corporate right to sue. The research also highlights the difficulty of finding a 
principled and effective distinction between different kinds of corporate claimant. It suggests 
that this exercise may be both impossible and counter-productive, and recommends that all 
non-human claimants should be treated in the same way. 
Keywords 
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marked (b) in Case 16. This research was funded by a scholarship from the Portsmouth Business School, 
University of Portsmouth. Thanks to Damian Carney, Lisa Wheeler, Greg Osborne, Eric Barendt and Judith 
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Introduction 
After a long process of consultation, the Defamation Act 2013 (‘the 2013 Act’) implemented a 
wide range of reforms to the tort of defamation. Among the most significant of these reforms 
was the introduction, in section 1(2), of a requirement to demonstrate ‘serious financial loss’, 
which applies to for-profit companies suing in libel or slander. Section 1 reads as follows: 
(1) A statement is not defamatory unless its publication has caused or is likely to cause 
serious harm to the reputation of the claimant. 
(2) For the purposes of this section, harm to the reputation of a body that trades for profit 
is not “serious harm” unless it has caused or is likely to cause the body serious financial 
loss. 
Although this was a substantial change in the law, overturning the long-standing rule that proof 
of actual damage was not required of corporate defamation claimants,1 it did not go as far as 
some reform campaigners recommended. Several groups and experts argued for the complete 
removal of the right to sue from some or all companies.2 Parliament decided against taking this 
approach, and in fact the 2013 Act places the corporate right to sue on a statutory footing for 
the first time.3 
Throughout the reform debate, certain key themes recurred in discussions of the suitable 
approach to take to corporate defamation claimants. Those advocating reform often suggested 
that the risk of claimants abusing libel laws to stifle criticism was particularly pronounced with 
respect to corporate claimants. Other common arguments included that corporations had 
                                                          
1 South Hetton Coal Company Ltd v North-Eastern News Association Ltd [1893] 1 QB 133 (CA) 138. 
2 Index on Censorship and English PEN, ‘Free Speech is Not for Sale’ (2009) 10 (‘FSINFS’); David Howarth, 
‘Libel: Its Purpose and Reform’ (2011) 74(6) Modern Law Review 845, 873-5. 
3 See Jameel v Wall Street Journal Europe SPRL [2007] UKHL 44 (‘Jameel v WSJ’) [152] (Baroness Hale): the 
proposition that ‘a company is in the same position as an individual’ when making a claim in defamation was 
capable of being overruled by the House of Lords. Before the 2013 Act, the same could have been said of the 
existence of the corporate right to sue. 
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alternative means of redress available to them; that there was frequently an ‘inequality of arms’ 
between wealthy corporate claimants and impecunious defendants; and that claims were too 
frequently brought, or succeeded too often, where the statements complained of were unlikely 
to result in financial loss. However, few of these arguments (or the claims of those refuting 
them) were based on more than anecdotal evidence. As Alastair Mullis and Andrew Scott noted 
at the time, ‘specific proposals [were] often based either on a dearth of evidence or a partial 
representation of the existing law.’4 
The ‘serious financial loss’ rule in section 1(2) was just one of a range of options available to 
Parliament that might have addressed complaints about corporate defamation law. Other 
suggestions included an Australian-style removal of the right to sue;5 the introduction of a 
permission stage for corporate claimants;6 and a requirement on those claimants to prove 
falsity.7 
The Government, however, maintained throughout the Parliamentary debates its original stance 
that a ‘separate provision specifically relating to corporations’ would be both unnecessary and 
potentially problematic.8 It was only at the last minute that the Government-sponsored 
Amendment 2B, which would go on to become sub-section 1(2) of the 2013 Act, was 
introduced into the House of Lords.9  
                                                          
4 Alastair Mullis and Andrew Scott, ‘Something Rotten in the State of English Libel Law? A Rejoinder to the 
Clamour for Reform of Defamation’ (2009) 6 Communications Law 173, 173. 
5 FSINFS (n 2) 10. The Australian provisions are: Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (Australian Capital Territory) s 
121; Defamation Act 2006 (Northern Territory) s 8; Defamation Act 2005 (New South Wales) s 9; Defamation 
Act 2005 (Queensland) s 9; Defamation Act 2005 (South Australia) s 9; Defamation Act 2005 (Tasmania) s 9; 
Defamation Act 2005 (Victoria) s 9; Defamation Act 2005 (Western Australia) s 9. 
6 Defamation HL Bill (2010-12) 003, cl 11. 
7 Culture, Media and Sport Committee, Press Standards, Privacy and Libel (HC 2009-10, 362-I) para 178 
(‘CMS Committee Report’). 
8 Ministry of Justice, The Government’s Response to the Report of the Joint Committee on the Draft Defamation 
Bill (Cm 8295, 2012) para 91 (‘Government Response to Joint Committee’); HC Deb 16 April 2013, vol 561, 
col 269 (Helen Grant MP). See also Ministry of Justice, Draft Defamation Bill: Consultation (CP3/11, 2011) 
paras 143 and 145 (‘MoJ Consultation’). 
9 HL Deb 23 April 2013, vol 744, col 1365 (‘HL Deb’). 
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Because of the late inclusion of the provision into the Bill, a number of questions about it went 
unanswered in the House of Lords. In particular, the concerns of Lord Faulks about the nature 
of the evidential requirement on corporate claimants were not addressed by Lord McNally, the 
Bill’s sponsor.10 The Government’s position of opposition to a provision specific to corporate 
claimants prevented Parliament from effectively scrutinising section 1(2) or sufficiently 
considering all of the alternative options. 
In summary, the ‘serious financial loss’ requirement was a significant change in the law that 
put a large group of potential claimants at a disadvantage – but one that was based largely on 
anecdotal evidence, and that arguably was not subject to sufficient debate in Parliament. My 
broad purpose in this paper is to begin to redress the first of these problems. I seek to test both 
the claims made by advocates of reform or their opponents, and the appropriateness of the 
reform eventually adopted by Parliament in the Defamation Act 2013. I do so through a 
systematic analysis of the courts’ approach to corporate defamation claims over the decade 
preceding the 2013 Act. The justification for taking this approach is my subject in the next 
section.  
Justification 
Although academic literature on English defamation law tends to be doctrinal in nature (with 
a considerable amount of additional literature provided by practitioners11), there are now also 
a significant number of empirical analyses of the area.12 These empirical analyses, however, 
focus primarily on studying the extra-legal ‘chilling effect’, whereby legitimate speech is 
                                                          
10 Ibid, col 1375. 
11 Eric Barendt, ‘What is the Point of Libel Law?’ (1999) 52 Current Legal Problems 110, 110. 
12 Examples include Eric Barendt and others, Libel and the Media: The Chilling Effect (Clarendon Press, 1st edn 
1997); Russell L Weaver and others, The Right to Speak Ill: Defamation, Reputation and Free Speech (Carolina 
Academic Press, 1st edn 2006); Andrew T Kenyon, Defamation: Comparative Law and Practice (UCL Press, 1st 
edn 2006); Judith Townend, ‘Online Chilling Effects in England and Wales’ (2014) 3(2) Internet Policy Review. 
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deterred by libel laws aimed at remedying the harm caused by illegitimate speech.13 To date, 
no systematic examination of the kind presented here – of libel law as applied by courts – has 
been performed in the UK. 
This kind of methodology has, however, been applied to US defamation law in the past, 
revealing a ‘pervasive division’ in outcomes between cases involving media and non-media 
defendants.14 A further example – more relevant to English law – is provided by Dan 
Kozlowski’s systematic analysis of the European Court of Human Rights’ jurisprudence on 
Article 10(2) of the Convention as it relates to defamation laws.15 Kozlowski notes that ‘legal 
scholars who have studied the court’s defamation jurisprudence have focused primarily on a 
handful of the court’s noteworthy cases’,16 an observation that could fairly be extended to 
domestic treatment of defamation case law. Kay Levine has, in the US, noted that the 
‘paradigm’ of traditional legal scholarship operates by ‘drawing conclusions about the law 
from a handful of select cases’.17 This is not necessarily problematic – doctrinal legal 
scholarship has produced much of value through this approach. Nonetheless, Levine argues 
that ‘the conventional legal scholar using this approach is sure to miss all kinds of interesting 
patterns and data that lurk beneath the surface of the chosen opinions.’18  
                                                          
13 Frederick Schauer, ‘Fear, Risk and the First Amendment: Unraveling the Chilling Effect’ (1978) 58 Boston 
University Law Review 685, 693. 
14 Marc A Franklin, ‘Winners and Losers and Why: A Study of Defamation Litigation’ (1980) 5(3) American 
Bar Foundation Research Journal 455, 497. The study was extended in Marc A Franklin, ‘Suing Media for 
Libel: A Litigation Study’ (1981) 6(3) American Bar Foundation Research Journal 795. See Randall P 
Bezanson, Gilbert Cranberg and John Soloski, Libel Law and the Press: Myth and Reality (Macmillan, 1st edn 
1987) 238: ‘prior to Franklin’s studies there had been no systematically obtained data about the outcome of libel 
cases’. 
15 Dan Kozlowski, ‘“For the Protection of the Reputation or Rights of Others”: The European Court of Human 
Rights’ Interpretation of the Defamation Exception in Article 10(2)’ (2006) 11 Communications Law and Policy 
133. 
16 Ibid, 136. 
17 Kay L Levine, ‘The Law is not the Case: Incorporating Empirical Methods into the Culture of Case Analysis’ 
(2006) 17 University of Florida Journal of Law & Public Policy 283, 284. 
18 Ibid, 286. 
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Mark Hall and Ronald Wright, in assessing US-based empirical legal literature, suggest that 
the systematic analysis of judgments ‘can augment conventional analysis by identifying 
previously unnoticed patterns that warrant deeper study,’19 and ‘offers distinctive insights that 
complement the types of understanding that only traditional analysis can generate.’20  
A concrete example of the kind of contribution that an analysis of judgments might make to 
existing literature may help. The subject of corporate claimants’ abuse of libel law has been 
studied from a variety of perspectives. Literature that draws conclusions from a small number 
of high profile cases can both contribute to developing a theoretical framework through which 
to view the issue, and demonstrate that a problem exists, at least in extreme cases.21 Empirical 
research focused on surveying or interviewing journalists or practitioners can investigate the 
nature and extent of the effect that cases like these have on journalistic practices.22 Comparative 
analysis of the content of newspapers, although focused on jurisdictions other than England, 
suggests that the chilling effect of abusive lawsuits and threats to sue may be more pronounced 
with respect to reporting on corporations.23 Combined, this research paints a picture – albeit an 
incomplete one – of the negative effect that corporate misuse of defamation law has on the 
quality of public debate. But by systematically analysing the extent to which this problem 
extends into the courts, and how the existing options open to the courts are used to deal with 
it, we may get a better idea of what kind of reform, if any, would address the issue most 
appropriately.24  
                                                          
19 Mark A Hall and Ronald F Wright, ‘Systematic Content Analysis of Judicial Opinions’ (2008) 96 California 
Law Review 63, 87. 
20 Ibid, 66. 
21 eg Fiona Donson, ‘Libel Cases and Public Debate – Some Reflections on whether Europe Should be 
Concerned about SLAPPs’ (2010) 19(1) Review of European Community and International Environmental Law 
83, drawing on McDonalds Corp v Steel [1997] EWHC 366 (QB) and British Chiropractic Association v Singh 
[2010] EWCA Civ 350. 
22 eg Barendt and others, Libel and the Media (n 12). 
23 Chris Dent and Andrew T Kenyon, ‘Defamation Law’s Chilling Effect: A Comparative Content Analysis of 
Australian and US Newspapers’ (2004) 9 Media & Arts Law Review 89. 
24 This subject is considered below: text to notes 79-147. 
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Methodology 
Purpose 
As noted above, the broad aims of this paper are to test some of the claims made by 
commentators during the reform process; and to assess the appropriateness of section 1(2) of 
the Defamation Act 2013, as compared to alternative options, by reference to the landscape of 
litigation to which Parliament was reacting. With that in mind, the topics that are investigated 
in most detail are: 
- the courts’ approach to ‘abusive’ or ‘trivial’ claims, and their use of the power to strike 
out claims; 
- the pleading of financial loss and the courts’ treatment thereof; 
- the existence of alternative means of redress for corporate claimants; and 
- potential means of differentiating between types of corporate claimant that should or 
should not be subject to any proposed reform.  
However, I was conscious that to unnecessarily restrict my analysis to those areas might cause 
me to miss important information. It was considered a good idea to be alert to the possible 
existence of ‘interesting patterns and data that lurk beneath the surface’.25 Some assorted 
observations that result from this broader analysis are noted towards the end of the paper.26 
Procedure 
The data used to conduct this analysis consisted of all available judgments handed down 
between 2004 and 2013 by the High Court, Court of Appeal or House of Lords27 in defamation 
                                                          
25 Levine (n 17) 286. 
26 Text to notes 237-55. 
27 The Supreme Court has not yet handed down a judgment in a defamation case involving a corporate claimant. 
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claims brought by non-human legal persons. ‘Non-human legal persons’ means all claimants 
that are not human beings, and therefore includes corporations and firms.28 
It would be dishonest to suggest that the ten-year time frame was initially chosen for any reason 
other than ten being a round number. Nevertheless, the choice has advantages. Firstly, it allows 
time for the courts, and parties to litigation, to have adjusted to the coming into force of the 
Human Rights Act 1998 and the Civil Procedure Rules.29 Secondly, the High Court began 
publishing its judgments under neutral citations in 2002, meaning that (in theory30) all relevant 
judgments should be available throughout the period studied. Although the judgments toward 
the latter end of the period could not have been relied upon during the reform process, they are 
still capable of revealing the practice of the courts under the libel regime that existed before 
the 2013 Act: the courts’ application of the law in 2013 was, at least ostensibly, unaffected by 
the passage of the Act.31  
The publication of judgments under neutral citations has another advantage, in that it alleviates 
the problem, noted by Franklin for example, of reported cases being given extra weight.32 In 
order to prevent this effect from creeping back in to the analysis, material in the headnotes of 
reported cases was not used in the analysis. 
To generate the data set, I conducted searches on both Westlaw and Lexis for judgments with 
either ‘defamation’, ‘slander’ or ‘libel’ in the keywords or headnote. Judgments were collected 
for all cases in which one or more of the claimants was non-human, and in which one or more 
of those claimants sued either in libel or slander, or in both. Ascension Securities Ltd v Motley 
                                                          
28 Also included is a failed attempt to sue by an unincorporated trust: Case 43. 
29 In October 2000 and April 1999 respectively. 
30 See text to notes 40-52. 
31 As a result of the Defamation Act 2013, s 16, sub-ss (4)-(7). See Case 37a [41]-[42]. 
32 Franklin, ‘Winners and Losers’ (n 14) 461. 
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Fool Ltd was also included: although no cause of action was identified by the claimant, the 
judge in that case ruled that the applicable law ‘must be’ libel.33 
Although the date range for inclusion in the survey was 1 January 2004 to 31 December 2013, 
all judgments were collected from each claim with any judgment falling within that period (for 
example, the judgment in Ontulmus v Collett dated December 201434 was included because 
there had been a previous judgment in the same case in April 201335). Additional judgments 
referred to in the existing judgments but not listed on the databases were also included where 
available, mainly found through Google searches.36 
All available judgments in each case were considered for inclusion, but were rejected if they 
related only to a separate cause of action,37 or if the non-human claimant had left the litigation 
before the judgment was delivered.38 
The final data set consisted of 89 judgments handed down in 54 claims. Because several claims 
were pursued by more than one corporate claimant, there were 62 claimants in total. More 
detail is given on the data set below.39 Each of the judgments was coded on topics relevant to 
the research questions, and this along with other information was recorded on a spreadsheet to 
be analysed.  
Limitations 
The most obvious limitation to the method used here is that it only investigates a small 
subcategory of defamation claims; namely, those that progress to the point of being the subject 
                                                          
33 Case 5 [5] (Collins J). 
34 Case 44c. 
35 Case 44a. 
36 eg Case 49a; Case 41a (substantially redacted).  
37 eg Pritchard Englefield v Steinberg [2005] EWHC 953 (Ch). 
38 eg Jameel v Times Newspapers Ltd (Pre-Trial Review) [2005] EWHC 1219 (QB). 
39 Text to notes 55-78. 
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of a court’s judgment.40 Therefore, the claims studied are not necessarily representative of any 
broader population. However, the study of judgments is both interesting and valuable in itself. 
The observations made can supplement existing research – both the doctrinal or theoretical 
research that reflects in greater depth on important concepts in the law, and the empirical 
research that studies the effects of the law outside the courts – and thereby contribute to a more 
accurate picture of the law in operation. 
Potentially relevant material that does not form part of the data set includes: the judgments of 
courts other than the High Court, Court of Appeal or House of Lords;41 decisions relating to 
applications for permission to appeal;42 ex tempore judgments of the High Court;43 the 
decisions of Masters in the High Court;44 statements in open court;45 and claims filed in the 
High Court but not heard. Each of these sets of data is excluded because of inconsistent 
availability, and the latter two because, even where available, they reveal no information about 
the judicial treatment of the claims. Some judgments were unavailable because they had not 
been transcribed,46 had been made private,47 or had been destroyed.48  
Serious issues with the availability of statistics on defamation litigation have been noted by a 
Parliamentary committee,49 the Ministry of Justice,50 and by academics.51 No systematic 
                                                          
40 Kenyon, Defamation (n 12) 107. See also Barendt and others, Libel and the Media (n 12) 40: ‘…only a small 
proportion of libel writs lead to the case being set down for trial, let alone to a trial itself.’ 
41 Claims filed in district registries, of which no central records are kept, were therefore not included: eg 
Seafresh Ltd v Shaw: <www.onebrickcourt.com/barristers.aspx?menu=main&pageid=25&barristerid=34>. 
42 eg McGrath v Dawkins [2013] EWCA Civ 206. 
43 eg the striking out of the defamation claim in Tesla Motors Ltd v BBC [2011] EWHC 2760 (QB). 
44 eg RFS Capital LLC v MD7 Europe (QB, 6 October 2009) <www.5rb.com/case/rfs-capital-llc-rfs-capital-bv-
v-md7-europe-michael-gianni>.  
45 eg Medicolegal Investigations Ltd v Sharma (Statement in Open Court, 18 July 2007).  
46 eg the full text of the judgment in Case 3. Transcription costs were beyond the budget for this research. 
47 eg the order of Sharp J referred to at [10] in Case 14. 
48 eg the judgment of Elias J against which an appeal was heard in Case 20a. That this document had been 
destroyed was confirmed by an email from the Queen’s Bench Action Department to the author (4 April 2016). 
49 CMS Committee Report (n 7) paras 207-8. 
50 Ministry of Justice, Report of the Libel Working Group (23 March 2010) para 8; MoJ Consultation (n 8) 
Annex E: Impact Assessment, paras 2.14-23. 
51 Judith Townend, ‘Closed Data: Defamation and Privacy Disputes in England and Wales’ (2013) 5(1) Journal 
of Media Law 31; Kenyon, Defamation (n 12) 107. 
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collection of statistics is undertaken by the High Court, and, until March 2014, claim forms 
were not filed by reference to the cause of action, meaning that it would be costly and time-
consuming for a researcher to identify all claims of a certain type filed with the court, especially 
considering that records are not digitised. Judith Townend has described the records of the 
Court as comparable to information ‘stored in a public filing cabinet with no drawer handles 
or labels.’52 I would only add that the Court considers it appropriate to charge ten pounds for 
the privilege of accessing that cabinet for quarter of an hour. 
The Impact Assessment for the Defamation Bill, produced by the Ministry of Justice (‘MoJ’), 
estimated that 44 defamation claims were filed at the High Court by businesses between 1 
October 2009 and 7 November 2011.53 Of the 54 claims analysed here, between 10 and 13 
were filed in this period.54 The same approximate ratio holds if the MoJ’s figures are 
extrapolated out to ten years – just over 200 claims filed in that period are represented by 54 in 
my data set. It would seem likely, therefore, that the claims analysed here represent roughly 
one quarter of all corporate claims filed in the High Court over the period studied. The 
remainder, presumably, will have been settled or discontinued before trial. 
The sample size is not sufficient for any meaningful quantitative analysis to be carried out on 
the data. For that reason, only descriptive statistics (ie one in ten, or ten per cent) are used here.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
52 Townend, ‘Closed Data’ (n 51) 32. 
53 MoJ Consultation (n 8) Annex E: Impact Assessment, para 2.61. 
54 A precise date is not available for Cases 29, 42 or 53, but the dates of the judgments would suggest that it is 
likely that at least one of these claims was also filed in the period in question. 
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Results and discussion 
General observations 
As noted above, the final data set consisted of 89 judgments relating to 54 claims brought by a 
total of 62 non-human claimants. Fifteen of those judgments were delivered by the Court of 
Appeal, and one by the House of Lords. The remainder, 73, were decisions of the High Court. 
The majority of claims were brought by only one corporate claimant: eight claims were brought 
by two companies simultaneously, and one by three companies.55 Only two companies – Las 
Vegas Sands Corp56 and Gentoo Group Ltd57 – brought separate claims against different 
defendants during the period studied. 
A wide variety of companies sued in defamation over this period. Thirteen were publicly-
traded, and a significant number of the privately-owned companies in the data set were part of 
a larger corporate group. However, claims were also brought by substantially smaller 
companies. Five of the 62 claimants could be described as not-for-profit organisations.58 A 
range of industries were also represented – from firms of solicitors59 to casino operators,60 
construction companies,61 and retailers.62 
Almost half (24) of the claims were brought against human defendants only, while the 
remainder were split fairly evenly between those brought only against companies (13) and 
those brought against both humans and companies (17). Corporate defendants tended to be 
either competitors of the claimant or, less often, media companies; human defendants were 
                                                          
55 Case 9. 
56 Case 1; Case 2. 
57 Case 24; Case 49. Sunderland Housing Co Ltd is the former name of Gentoo Group Ltd. 
58 Case 10; Case 21; Cases 24 and 49; Case 34 (1st claimant); Case 43. 
59 eg Case 7; Case 34 (2nd claimant); Case 46. 
60 eg Case 1; Case 2; Case 6. 
61 eg Case 8. 
62 eg Case 50. 
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more varied, although a substantial number were employees or ex-employees either of the 
claimant or of a corporate defendant. 
Interestingly, around half of all the claims studied were brought with respect to internet 
publications only, and only three claimants that obtained judgment in their favour sued in 
respect of physical publications only.63 Perhaps this is not particularly surprising, but it lends 
support to the perception that internet-based publications are increasingly becoming the norm 
in defamation actions.64 The facts of cases such as Islam Expo Ltd v Spectator (1828) Ltd (on 
whether hyperlinked content could be considered part of the context of the words complained 
of65) and Sheffield Wednesday Football Club Ltd v Hargreaves (a Norwich Pharmacal 
application66 related to pseudonymous website contributors67) would have been entirely 
unforeseeable two decades ago. 
The outcomes of the cases studied are not necessarily easy to measure. As Hall and Wright 
note, ‘Defining what counts as a win or loss across a range of cases is not a simple matter.’68 
Twelve of the claims (just over a fifth) resulted in judgment being entered for the claimant, but 
two things should be noted about this figure. Firstly, three of these claims were brought against 
the same defendant, Rick Kordowski, in the long-running ‘Solicitors from Hell’ litigation.69 
Secondly, in one of those claims, only one of the two corporate claimants successfully relied 
on the cause of action in defamation.70 In a further two claims, the claimant obtained judgment 
against only one of three defendants.71  
                                                          
63 Case 33; Case 20 (both in respect of letters); Case 17 (signs displayed on defendants’ properties). 
64 Jenny Afia and Phil Hartley, ‘Lord Lester’s Draft Defamation Bill 2010: A Practical Analysis’ (2010) 2(2) 
Journal of Media Law 183, 191. 
65 Case 29. 
66 Norwich Pharmacal Co v Customs and Excise Commissioners [1974] AC 133. 
67 Case 48. 
68 Hall and Wright (n 19) 108. 
69 Cases 7, 34 and 46. 
70 Case 34. 
71 Case 16; Case 40. 
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At least eight claimants settled their claims, with the largest reported settlement being the 
£300,000  (plus over £2m in costs) paid to Collins Stewart Ltd by the Financial Times.72 
Thirteen of the claims were struck out by the court.73 One claimant failed to convince the court 
to disapply the limitation period in order that a claim could be brought;74 and one failed to 
obtain an injunction before publication.75 One claimant lost at trial;76 and the only finding of 
liability made by a jury was eventually overturned on appeal.77 In addition, at least three 
claimants abandoned their claims.78  
The following four sections will focus on the findings of the analysis in relation to the main 
research questions studied. Some assorted observations on the data are then made before the 
paper’s conclusion. 
‘Abusive’ or ‘trivial’ lawsuits 
Although noted already, it should be reiterated that the extent to which a study of court 
judgments can investigate the problem of abusive lawsuits, and the chilling effect that they 
cause, is limited. As Mullis and Scott point out, ‘The problem with libel has always been and 
remains the harm caused by threats and bullying in the shadow of the law’,79 which, by their 
nature, cannot be studied here. The clearest demonstration of this limitation is the fact that 
high-profile claims such as NMT v Wilmshurst, brought by a US-based pharmaceutical 
company, do not appear in the data set. Although it was never the subject of a High Court 
                                                          
72 Russell Hotten, ‘FT Agrees Huge Payout as Middleweek Case is Finally Settled’ Daily Telegraph (18 Jan 
2006) <www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/markets/2930366/FT-agrees-huge-payout-as-Middleweek-case-is-finally-
settled.html>. 
73 In addition, the claim in Case 40a was struck out against two out of three claimants. In Case 11, the claimant 
was able to extract settlements from two defendants before the action was struck out against the third. 
74 Case 25. 
75 Case 9. 
76 Case 6. 
77 Case 31g. 
78 Case 5; Case 10; Case 42. 
79 Alastair Mullis and Andrew Scott, ‘The Defamation Bill 2012: Missing the Wood (With No Excuses)’ 
(Inforrm, 6 June 2012) <inforrm.wordpress.com/2012/06/06/the-defamation-bill-2012-missing-the-wood-with-
no-excuses-alastair-mullis-and-andrew-scott/>. 
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judgment, defendant Peter Wilmshurst reported that he spent £300,000 and four years 
defending the claim.80 Concern was expressed about this case, and others like it, by the House 
of Commons Culture, Media and Sport Committee (‘CMS Committee’),81 the Joint Committee 
on the Draft Defamation Bill,82 and, more recently, the Northern Ireland Law Commission.83 
Wilmshurst’s case was considered to be illustrative of the chilling effect of corporate 
defamation claims on scientific discourse,84 and was described as a ‘cause célèbre’ of the 
reform movement by Lord McNally in the House of Lords.85 
Despite this problem, the data gathered here can give some important insights into the issue of 
trivial or abusive lawsuits, by contributing to a greater understanding of whether and to what 
extent these claims find their way into the courts, and of how the courts deal with them when 
they do. 
Advocates of reform were occasionally criticised for relying on anecdotal evidence of abusive 
or trivial lawsuits to support their arguments for restricting the corporate right to sue. For 
example, the suggestion by the CMS Committee that corporate defamation law ‘has already 
led to a stifling effect on freedom of expression’86 was considered by Magnus Boyd to have 
been ‘drawn from only two cases over the last eleven years’.87 The criticism undoubtedly has 
merit. The reliance on insubstantial evidence might be epitomised by a comment made by Paul 
Farrelly MP, a member of the Committee, during the gathering of evidence. Farrelly stated that 
‘many of the actions taken by large corporations in particular are not primarily about money’, 
                                                          
80 HL Deb (n 9) col 1371. 
81 CMS Committee Report (n 7) para 141. 
82 Joint Committee on the Draft Defamation Bill, Report (2010-12, HL 203, HC 930-1) para 47 (‘Joint 
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and in support of this assertion cited two cases ‘where the avowed intention of the litigant was 
to drive the publisher out of business’88 – Goldsmith v Pressdram89 and Aitken v Guardian 
News & Media90 – only one of which (the former) involved a corporate claimant. 
Valid though this criticism may be, the evidence relied on by those claiming that the problem 
was being exaggerated was no less anecdotal. Boyd, for example, after criticising the CMS 
Committee’s reliance on anecdotal evidence, stated that the ‘vast majority of corporate 
claimants’ have legitimate cases, and that it was ‘abundantly clear that the McLibel case was 
atypical’ without citing any further evidence.91 
Both sides of this debate, then, relied on little more than bare assertions to support their 
respective cases. Despite this, the Government’s stated intention in introducing the ‘serious 
harm’ test, and by extension the ‘serious financial loss’ aspect of that test applicable to 
corporate claimants, was to ‘remove the scope for trivial and unfounded actions succeeding’,92 
which seems to accept without question that there was such a scope in the first place. The 
systematic analysis undertaken here can plausibly contribute to a more rigorous evidential base 
on which to judge these arguments. 
It is worth noting here that the issue of abusive or trivial claims is often linked in the reform 
literature to concern about ‘inequality of arms’,93 an issue which is taken up in greater detail in 
the section below on ‘Categorising corporate claimants’.94 At this point it is sufficient to say 
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that in practice it may be extremely difficult to differentiate between claimants whose wealth 
gives them the capacity to stifle speech and those who have more limited resources. 
The most important finding of this analysis in relation to abusive or trivial defamation claims 
is the simple observation that a worryingly large proportion of the corporate claims studied 
were criticised in some way by the courts. Of the 54 claims, 21 were the subject of some kind 
of judicial criticism.95 
In relation to the issue of abusive claims, cases were coded into one of six categories,96 as 
follows: 
1. No mention of abuse or criticism of the claimant in the judgment(s). 
2. Claim was declared by the judge to be ‘abusive’, ‘vexatious’ or similar. 
3. Judge criticised the claimant’s conduct or questioned its motive. 
4. The claim itself, or part of the claim, was criticised as being weak or improperly 
pleaded. 
5. Judge specifically noted that the claim, or the claimant’s conduct, was legitimate (ie 
motivated by a desire to vindicate reputation) or not abusive. 
6. Other – unable to categorise. 
Only two claims fell into the ‘Other’ category. The first was Pritchard Englefield v Steinberg,97 
which was considered to be too difficult to categorise. The Court of Appeal, when it heard the 
case for the first time in 2005, investigated the basis of the claim in order to ‘ensure that its 
process [was] not being misused’,98 and found that it ‘was a long way from the situation found 
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in Jameel [v Dow Jones].’99 This suggests that the Court was satisfied that the use of litigation 
was not disproportionate to the scope of publication, but the decision was considered to be too 
vague to warrant inclusion in category five, because the Court did not specifically make 
reference to the claimants’ motivation. The difficulty of categorising this case is added to by 
the High Court’s suggestion in 2011 that '[h]ad the Court of Appeal's later decision in Jameel 
... been available in 2003, an argument might well have been raised of abuse of process. 
Whether it would have succeeded cannot now be determined.'100 The second claim in the 
‘Other’ category was North London Central Mosque Trust v Policy Exchange,101 the 
interpretation of which is complicated by the fact that the intended claimant charity was not 
recognised as having legal personality. Eady J made reference to the failure of the trustees, who 
had sought to sue on behalf of the charity once its lack of standing had been recognised, to 
establish in advance that using charitable funds for the litigation would be reasonable.102 This, 
technically, was not a criticism of a corporate claimant, since none existed. It was also thought 
too vague to warrant inclusion in any other category. 
Claims that were struck out as an abuse of process were not automatically added to the second 
category. As explained by Tugendhat J in Hays Plc v Hartley, ‘[t]he word “abuse” has a special 
meaning in the law and implies no subjective wrongful state of mind on the part of the Claimant 
or its lawyers.’103 One example is the claim in Euromoney Institutional Investor Plc v Aviation 
News Ltd, which was struck out as an abuse of process, on the basis that any damages that 
would have been recoverable would not have been worth the cost of the litigation, without the 
judge making a clear criticism of the claimant or its conduct.104 
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Several points need to be noted about this particular set of results. Firstly, judges have a 
tendency to be restrained in their language, meaning that comments made in judgments 
sometimes need to be ‘read between the lines’. For example, Tesco Stores Ltd v Guardian News 
& Media,105 described to the CMS Committee as ‘an outrageous piece of bullying’,106 fell into 
category three because of the judge’s fairly vague references to the claimant’s motive in 
delaying the decision whether to accept or reject an offer of amends. There is a risk that the 
categorisation of these comments might reflect a bias on the part of the researcher. Secondly, 
judges tend only to comment on issues raised by the parties to the case. This is likely to have 
the greatest effect on category five – a judge is likely to take the genuineness of a claimant’s 
motivations as a given unless an argument is raised by the defendant that the action amounts 
to an abuse of process. Presumably, at the very least those claims that resulted in judgment 
being entered for the claimant would fall into this category, but in some no comment was made 
by the court. Thirdly, two claimants that went on to obtain judgment in their favour against one 
defendant were criticised for elements of their claim relating to other defendants.107 
The danger of relying too heavily on judicial criticism of claimants is demonstrated by the case 
Hayden v Charlton.108 In the High Court, Sharp J had described the claimants’ conduct of the 
litigation as ‘completely unacceptable’,109 finding that the claimants had ‘no genuine desire to 
pursue [the litigation] or to vindicate their reputation’.110 These remarks were among the 
strongest criticisms made of any claim in the data set. However, in the Court of Appeal, it was 
revealed that the claimants were unaware of the striking out until the first claimant was 
contacted by the press for comment.111 In that hearing, Toulson LJ stated that he had ‘no reason 
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to disbelieve’ the claimants’ evidence suggesting that the inappropriate conduct of the litigation 
was the fault of their solicitors.112 This case was coded into category five, because the highest 
court to hear it accepted that the claimants were motivated by a genuine belief ‘that the 
perpetuation of the allegations against them has been damaging to their reputation’.113 
Regardless of these issues, the proportion of cases in which the judge expressed concern with 
the claimant’s conduct of the litigation is startling. Five cases were placed in category two, in 
which the judge’s criticism of the claimants was most trenchant. Probably the most worrying 
of these is Lonzim Plc v Sprague, in which Tugendhat J had ‘no hesitation’ in describing the 
slander claim as ‘vexatious’,114 and described the claim overall as ‘totally without merit’ under 
CPR 3.4(6).115 In that case, an email sent by one of the claimants to the defendant had 
threatened to ‘nail you to the corporate cross for the stuff you said about us’ and ‘stomp your 
corporate head’.116 As Tugendhat J pointed out, this email was ‘further evidence’ that the claim 
was ‘pursued for reasons other than to obtain vindication’.117 
Not all of the claims in category two were this extreme, but all were concerning in one way or 
another. In Wallis v Meredith, Clarke J noted that the claimants’ pre-action correspondence had 
been ‘persistently harsh in tone and belligerent in content’,118 before coming to the ‘clear 
conclusion’ that the action was an abuse of process.119 In Dorset Flint & Stone Blocks Ltd v 
Moir, Eady J agreed with the defendant’s characterisation of the claim as an ‘artificial 
construct’.120 In Duke v University of Salford, the same judge regarded the basis of the 
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university’s claim as ‘wholly unreal’,121 and the pleaded meanings as ‘contrived in the 
extreme’.122 The last case to be included in this category was described by the judge as 
‘bear[ing] all the hallmarks of forum shopping’,123 and the damages plea as being ‘doomed to 
failure’.124 
The third category, in which the claimant’s conduct or motive was questioned, contains ten 
claims subject to a range of criticisms. There were several cases in which the judge expressed 
a view that the claim, or part of it, may have been brought for a ‘collateral purpose’ other than 
to vindicate reputation.125 Other claimants were criticised for their ‘oppressive and bullying’126 
or ‘extraordinarily lax’127 conduct of the litigation. One claimant’s conduct was considered to 
be ‘highly unreasonable and well outside the norm’,128 while another was criticised for having 
‘no apparent concern about the costs generated’ by the litigation.129 
The fourth category, claims criticised as weak or improperly pleaded, also contains a range of 
cases, with five falling into this category in total. In some cases, the pleadings were described 
as ‘gravely deficient’130 or ‘rather contrived’.131 In another, ‘insufficient care’ was said to have 
been taken with evidence presented to a Master when permission was sought to serve the claim 
out of the jurisdiction.132 
The above might appear to paint a bleak picture of corporate defamation litigation, but there 
were five cases in the data set in which the judge expressly declared that the claimants were 
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acting ‘in good faith’.133 Moreover, judges in a number of cases were critical of the behaviour 
of defendants. As might be expected, judges were often critical of Rick Kordowski, with one 
describing him as a ‘vexatious litigant’.134 Even setting that particular defendant aside, there 
was a suggestion that evidence had been tampered with,135 the grant of a civil restraint order 
against a defendant,136 and the predictable instances of US-based defendants refusing to defend 
claims made against them in English courts.137 
These findings, on balance, support the claims made during the reform debates that corporate 
claimants too often used defamation laws in an oppressive way. However, the important caveat 
must be added that this does not by any means apply to all, or even a majority of, defamation 
claims brought by companies. 
The courts’ approach to problematic cases 
All of the cases placed in the most serious category were struck out in one hearing in the High 
Court and not heard again, with the exception of Atlantis World Group of Companies NV v 
Grouppo Editoriale L’Espresso SpA,138 in which the claim failed at trial. Although this might 
seem to be encouraging, it may hide the true burden of defamation litigation on defendants. As 
an example, the University of Salford action was the subject of a hearing before a District Judge 
in Manchester before permission to appeal was rejected on paper twice, then granted at an oral 
hearing. Following the striking out of the claim by the High Court, permission to appeal to the 
Court of Appeal was granted before the claim was finally abandoned, the university having 
spent £150,000 in costs in the process.139 
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Although the number of claimants criticised is troubling, it is difficult in most cases to see what 
more the courts could have done with respect to those claims. Some commentators have argued 
for the more effective use of striking out mechanisms,140 but there do not appear to be any 
obvious cases in which the court’s power to strike out a claim could have been used but was 
not, and, of course, the use of the power depends on the defendant having made an application 
to strike out. Arguments for the more effective use of strike out must also take into account 
claimants’ article 6 right to a fair trial.141  
One interpretation of section 1 of the 2013 Act is that its primary effect will be to enable the 
courts to strike out claims that do not disclose any evidence of harm to reputation or financial 
loss.142 This appears to be plausible, albeit in a small number of cases. In Jameel v Times 
Newspapers Ltd and Citation Plc v Ellis Whittam Ltd, permission was granted to appeal a High 
Court decision striking out the claim,143 despite the paucity of evidence of financial loss in 
each.144 It is possible that these claims would have been dealt with more quickly (or perhaps 
not brought at all) under the new regime. 
The case that would most obviously have been affected by section 1(2) is Howe & Co v 
Burden.145 In that case, Eady J held that there was insufficient evidence to grant summary 
judgment in favour of the defendants, even though he found that the statements complained of 
‘do not seem to have reached a wider audience or done the Claimants any harm’.146 However, 
it is notable that this case falls in the first year of the period studied – the claim would almost 
certainly have been struck out had it been heard after the Court of Appeal’s decision in Jameel 
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v Dow Jones, which allows the courts to strike out claims that do not assert a ‘real and 
substantial tort’.147  
Claimants’ alternative options 
A common argument made by those who supported the complete removal of the right to sue in 
defamation from some or all corporations was that means of obtaining vindication other than a 
defamation suit are often available to companies. The argument is put in several ways. Firstly, 
alternative legal remedies – typically the tort of malicious falsehood – are considered to provide 
sufficient protection to corporate reputation.148 Secondly, it is suggested that, in some cases, a 
corporation will be able to vindicate its reputation through an action brought by an employee 
or director.149 Finally, it is contended that corporations have access to extra-legal means of 
achieving vindication, such as publicity campaigns, that tend not to be available to 
individuals.150  
I should point out at this stage that I see all of these variants of the argument as logically flawed. 
The availability in some cases of an alternative action in malicious falsehood, or any other tort, 
has very little in principle to do with whether a company should be entitled to sue in defamation. 
As recognised by the Court of Appeal, the two torts ‘have developed with different 
characteristics; they make different demands on the parties; and they offer redress for different 
things.’151 The question of the right to sue in defamation should be answered with reference to 
the particular functions and features of that tort, not a variety of other causes of action that may 
or may not be available in some cases where a company has a potential defamation claim.  
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The second argument is fallacious for the same reason – the right of a person associated with a 
company to sue in defamation for statements harming her reputation is logically distinct from 
the right of the company to sue, even in cases where the same statement harms the reputations 
of the company and the person simultaneously. 
The third argument, that companies have extra-legal means available to counter defamatory 
falsehoods, is flawed on a number of counts. The first is that it is not necessarily true in all 
cases. Responding to an equivalent argument made about ‘public figure’ claimants, Eric 
Barendt notes that ‘it is simply not true that public figures … necessarily have an effective 
opportunity to put the record straight when defamatory remarks are made about them.’152 The 
same point could be made with regard to corporate claimants. The suggestion that corporations 
should deploy ‘rehabilitative advertising or public relations campaigns’,153 rather than 
investing shareholders’ money in advertising for usual reasons, also seems odd. At least when 
a company litigates in an attempt to counter harm caused by defamatory falsehoods, some of 
the funds spent on the litigation will be recoverable if it succeeds. 
This latter argument cannot, at any rate, be considered in depth here, except to say that the 
seven claims brought against ‘traditional’ media companies presumably represent instances in 
which the corporate claimant was unable, through pre-action correspondence or otherwise, to 
exert enough influence on the media to control coverage.154 The suggestion that ‘smaller 
companies [are] unable to issue proceedings against … well-financed media defendants’155 
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may also be true – Andrew James Enforcement Ltd v ITV Plc appears to be the only case against 
a large media company brought by a relatively small corporate claimant.156 
Regardless of the problems with the other two strands of this argument, it is important to 
investigate them for two reasons. Firstly, they were influential during the reform process, and 
one of my intentions here is to test the claims made during those debates. Secondly, if either of 
them is found to be true, then it may still make a valid contribution to a broader argument for 
reform. After all, if every corporate defamation claimant was also suing in malicious falsehood, 
and obtaining the same outcome through that tort, then one of those causes of action would be 
redundant. 
Alternative legal remedies 
The claimant(s) in 18 of the 54 cases asserted at least one other cause of action in addition to 
libel or slander. Predictably, the most common of these is malicious falsehood, pleaded in half 
of those 18 cases. In one case, the claimants relied on ‘no less than ten causes of action’,157 
although this was an outlier – no other claimant relied on more than three. 
Of the 12 claimants that obtained judgment in their favour, four relied on at least one alternative 
cause of action, 158 one of which was abandoned.159 All three of the remaining claimants were 
successful in both libel and the alternative cause(s) of action. 
It is interesting to note that, of the 21 claims criticised in some way by the courts, just six 
featured a claim in a cause of action other than libel or slander. Further, of the 13 claims struck 
out, just two included a claim other than defamation.160 This suggests that those companies 
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illegitimately using the court process to silence criticism overwhelmingly do so through the 
defamation torts.  
With regard to claims brought only in defamation, it is difficult to assess the potential 
applicability of a different cause of action. Nevertheless, combined with the observations below 
on human claimants, this study suggests that the ‘alternative options’ argument has some 
weight. 
Human claimants 
In almost half (26) of the claims analysed, the corporate claimant sued alongside one or more 
human claimants. When looking only at those claims in which there was a finding of liability, 
the proportion involving human claimants rises significantly. Of the twelve cases in this 
category, only three were brought solely by corporate claimants.161 
These statistics have concerning implications. In Jameel v Times Newspapers Ltd, Sedley LJ 
warned of the need for ‘caution’ in allowing companies to claim alongside their owners or 
directors. He suggested that ‘[i]f every libel claimant is able to draw in his wake a string of 
companies claiming that they have been injured because their proprietor has been, English libel 
litigation, already something of a honeypot, will become a goldrush.’162 Additional claims by 
corporations inevitably increase the cost of defending actions, and may also have a substantial 
effect on damages. 
When the late inclusion of section 1(2) in the Defamation Bill was being debated in the House 
of Commons, Sir Edward Garnier MP suggested that corporate defamation claimants ‘probably 
attract £20,000 [in general damages] at the top end and usually no more than £10,000, so we 
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are not talking about hugely extravagant damages claims.’163 This is, generally, true – although 
Garnier presumably forgot about Cooper v Turrell and Metropolitan International Schools Ltd 
v Designtechnica Corp, in which the corporate claimants were awarded general damages of 
£30,000 and £50,000 respectively.164 The average award of general damages (discounting those 
cases in which no general damages were awarded165) was slightly over £15,000. However, once 
the awards made to human claimants and the awards made to corporate claimants in alternative 
causes of action are taken into account, along with the special damages award in Culla Park 
Ltd v Richards,166 the average liability increases to over £40,000, plus costs. It must also be 
remembered that these awards were almost all made against human defendants, and not against 
well-resourced media companies. Of the three corporate defendants found liable, those in 
Downtex Plc v Flatley and Ernst & Young LLP v Coomber appear to have been small 
companies closely linked to a human defendant.167 
Some of these corporate claims, especially that in Applause Store Productions Ltd v Raphael,168 
appear to add very little to the claim brought by the associated human claimant. The corporate 
claimant in Applause Store was able to recover £5,000 in defamation, alongside a total of 
£17,000 granted to the human claimant in defamation and breach of confidence, despite the 
fact that there was no evidence of publication to more than a few people,169 and no evidence of 
loss.170 Had the claimant in Jon Richard Ltd v Gornall not been granted summary judgment,171 
with damages therefore capped at £10,000,172 the judge considered that the appropriate award 
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of damages – in a case where no loss was shown, and remembering that corporate claimants 
are not entitled to aggravated damages173 – would have been £75,000.174 This is not a modest 
sum by any measure. 
Further, of the three successful companies that did not sue alongside a human claimant, two 
are likely to have been successful had they relied on malicious falsehood,175 which requires 
proof of falsity, loss and malice. In Creative Resins International Ltd v Glasslam Europe Ltd, 
Eady J found that the claimant had established falsity.176 He also held that the statements 
complained of were ‘calculated to undermine [the claimant’s] commercial reputation’;177 
worded similarly to the requirements of the Defamation Act 1952, section 3.178 Finally, he 
found that a potential defence of qualified privilege would have been defeated by proof of 
malice, since the publication ‘took place cynically and dishonestly.’179 A malicious falsehood 
claim in Jon Richard180 would have depended on whether expenditure in mitigation of loss 
counts as damage in that tort,181 as the statement complained of caused no other loss. Falsity 
and malice would not have presented a problem for the claimant in that case. 
Therefore, disregarding those companies with alternative causes of action, only one successful 
corporate claimant in ten years remains – Metropolitan International Schools Ltd. Of course, 
this obscures the reality somewhat – removing the right to sue from companies would affect 
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all of those potential claimants who might legitimately use the threat of proceedings to extract 
an apology, retraction or settlement.  
Nevertheless, there is widespread and justified discontent at the capacity of corporations to 
stifle speech on matters of public interest through the threat of a defamation suit. A 
corporation’s defamation claim does not need to be successful – or even to be heard – in order 
to have a stifling effect of freedom of expression. These negative externalities of the corporate 
right to sue can most effectively be mitigated by removing that right. In Australia, for example, 
corporate threats to sue against one media outlet ‘all but disappeared’ within a year of the 
removal of the right to sue from larger companies.182 Changes to the substantive law short of 
removing the right to sue will not prevent companies from making these threats. In this context, 
it is essential that a clear and convincing justification is given for the continued existence of 
the corporate right to sue. The apparent lack of companies that successfully sued in defamation 
over the period studied, and that could not have vindicated their reputations through other 
means, indicates that such a justification may not exist. 
When one takes into account the observation made below, that some successful claimants may 
have been relying on a defamation claim as their ‘last chance’ to vindicate their reputations 
against unresponsive defendants,183 it may be desirable to allow a company to pursue a 
defamation claim if it can demonstrate to the court that there is no alternative course of action, 
legal or extra-legal, that would offer it a reasonable prospect of obtaining comparable 
vindication. The concerns expressed about the costs implications of a permission stage are 
valid,184 but it seems likely that a substantial proportion of claims would be dispensed with 
much more quickly and less expensively under a system such as this.  
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Financial loss 
The pleading of financial loss by corporate claimants was a major theme in the reform debates. 
On the one hand, some expressed concern at the ability of companies to sue ‘where there is no 
realistic prospect of serious financial loss.’185 On the other, it was often suggested that the 
requirement to prove actual loss would be too onerous on corporations.186 This was one of the 
major reasons given by the House of Lords in Jameel v Wall Street Journal Europe SPRL 
(‘Jameel v WSJ’) for its refusal to require corporate claimants to demonstrate loss.187  
This latter argument is rather weak. Firstly, as has been noted elsewhere, proof of loss is 
required in almost all other torts.188 Secondly, and probably more importantly, the rule in 
Ratcliffe v Evans, allowing claimants to rely on a ‘general loss of business’ where special 
damage is not quantifiable,189 was designed to reduce the burden on claimants that might 
struggle for legitimate reasons to precisely quantify their loss. Regardless, the argument was 
often raised during the reform process, and appears to have been the main reason for the 
inclusion of the words ‘or is likely to cause’ in section 1(2).190 
This section intends to investigate whether the perception that it was too easy for companies to 
sue without proof of loss was accurate. It also seeks to examine claims about the difficulty of 
pleading loss. 
To those ends, the cases were coded into one of five categories, as follows: 
1. No reference to financial loss in judgment(s). 
2. Claimant pleaded special damage. 
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3. Reference to unquantified or unquantifiable loss. 
4. Other - reference to some other kind of loss or harm. 
5. No evidence of loss or no loss caused. 
There are a number of difficulties with investigating pleas of financial loss through these 
judgments. Firstly, statements of claim were not readily available. In order to avoid the 
introduction of bias, those that were found were not used. Therefore, the results rely on the 
judge mentioning the extent to which damage is pleaded – hence, a large proportion of claims 
(18 of 54) fall into category one. Secondly, there was no requirement on any of these claimants 
to demonstrate loss (at least as regards their claims in defamation). Reliance on the presumption 
of loss does not necessarily mean that no actual loss was caused by the statement complained 
of, or that such loss could not have been proved. This is especially the case if one accepts 
Tugendhat J’s statement on the presumptions of loss and falsity: 
Claimants normally rely on these presumptions only during the stages of the 
proceedings up to the trial of the action. At any trial (or any assessment of damages) 
claimants normally choose to put before the court evidence with a view to proving both 
that the words complained of are false, and that the claimants have suffered actual 
damage as a result of the defamatory publication.191 
Given that only nine of the judgments studied were with respect to trials or assessments of 
damages, this effect – if real – may skew the data collected towards showing a failure to adduce 
evidence of loss.192 
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Nevertheless, there were 15 cases – over a quarter of those analysed – in which the court noted 
either that no evidence of loss had been given, or that no loss had been caused by the statement 
complained of. 
Some of these cases were more worrying than others. Wallis v Meredith,193 for example, 
involved a statement published to only one person, the claimants’ solicitor, which could not 
reasonably have caused any loss. Similarly, in Jeeg Global Ltd v Hare, the statement in 
question was published to only one person, who did not believe it.194 Both of these claims 
would surely have been struck out under section 1(2) of the 2013 Act; under the pre-existing 
law, only the former was. 
Special damage pleas were rare – seven, in six cases195 – and almost never successful. The only 
award of special damages was made in Culla Park, in which £70,000 was claimed and £39,000 
awarded.196 It may be concerning that, of these special damage pleas, four were in the millions 
of pounds, and one was for roughly £750,000.197 The largest damages claim was for 
approximately £230 million.198 Claims of these proportions, even though all were unsuccessful, 
inevitably increase the uncertainty caused to defendants by the possibility of losing in court. 
Eight claimants argued that they had suffered or would suffer financial loss, but that the loss 
was as-yet unquantified,199 or that it was by nature unquantifiable. Those cases falling into the 
latter part of this category may indicate that some of the concerns about the difficulty of 
pleading financial loss are well-founded. In Coys Ltd v Autocherish Ltd, an application for an 
interim injunction, the claimants contended – and the judge accepted – that ‘there may never 
be a way of showing what damage [would] be caused’ if the defamatory statements were 
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repeated.200 Similarly, the claimants in Mama Group Ltd v Sinclair, organisers of a music 
festival, noted that ‘the costs of finding persons who had not turned up to the festival for the 
loss of profit on one ticket would be prohibitive.’201 These are valid concerns, but, again, these 
situations are precisely the kind in which the claimants would be assisted by the rule in Ratcliffe 
v Evans. 
Seven claims fell into the ‘Other’ category. One of these – Adelson v Associated Newspapers 
Ltd – was included for the claimant’s somewhat ambiguous claim that loss was likely to result 
from the impairment of its ‘ability to negotiate for business to be carried on by a subsidiary to 
be formed in the future’.202 Another was included for an extremely vague reference to a 
‘potentially valuable trademark’.203 The remaining five in this category were all successful 
claimants with no direct evidence of financial loss. In three of these claims, the judge made 
reference to the likelihood of injury to goodwill or similar;204 in the other two, reference was 
made to the effect of the statement complained of on existing or potential employees.205 
Some of these claimants may have struggled to meet the requirements of section 1(2), but it is 
not possible to say that their defamation claims would inevitably have failed under the 2013 
Act, especially given Warby J’s willingness to accept some fairly vague evidence of loss in 
Brett Wilson LLP v Person(s) Unknown.206  
Nonetheless, there were a few cases in which successful claimants had little or no evidence of 
loss. As mentioned above, the corporate claimant in Applause Store would likely have failed 
to overcome the ‘serious financial loss’ hurdle.207 Similarly, in both Jon Richard and Pritchard 
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Englefield, there was no evidence of financial loss – although in the latter the human claimant 
would have been unaffected, and in the former there may have been a viable claim in malicious 
falsehood.208  
The difficulty of assessing the likely effect of section 1(2) on the claims studied has already 
been noted. There may be some examples of cases that the courts could have dispensed with 
more efficiently had they had the 2013 Act at their disposal. However, there are a number of 
cases where it seems unlikely that the ‘serious financial loss’ requirement would have had a 
significant effect. It is important to note that even those claims that would have been struck out 
under section 1(2) could still have been brought, and potentially could have been the subject 
of several preliminary hearings. For those potential defendants with limited means, the expense 
of having a claim against them struck out at an early stage, although less than the cost of a full 
trial, is still sufficient to create a significant chilling effect on expression. In this sense, the 
effect of the 2013 Act, both in the courts and more widely, may only be marginal. 
Categorising corporate claimants 
As the Joint Committee on the Draft Defamation Bill noted, there is ‘enormous variety in the 
size, available resources and influence of corporations’,209 and this variety appears to be 
reflected in the range of claimants that sued for defamation between 2004 and 2013.210 
As a result, the nature of any reform directed at corporate defamation claimants was not the 
only choice that Parliament needed to make in the 2013 Act. Another important consideration 
was the scope of that reform; that is, which corporate claimants it would relate to. Parliament 
chose, in sub-section 1(2), the phrase ‘body that trades for profit’ to delineate those non-human 
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claimants that would be subject to the serious financial loss requirement from those that would 
be subject only to the ‘serious harm’ requirement in sub-section (1). 
Other jurisdictions have taken different approaches. Legislation in both Ireland and New 
Zealand refers to ‘bod[ies] corporate’,211 while in Australia the right to sue was removed from 
some companies based on their number of employees and their objects.212 The defendants in 
McDonalds Corp v Steel (‘McLibel’) and Jameel v WSJ proposed restrictions on the right to 
sue of ‘multinational corporations’ and ‘foreign corporations’ respectively,213 and the Libel 
Reform Campaign suggested that ‘large and medium-sized corporations’ should not be 
permitted to sue in defamation.214 
The results of this study suggest that this is a very significant issue, and possibly reveal a 
fundamental difficulty with the law of corporate defamation. On the one hand, perhaps the 
most striking observation to be made of the cases as a whole is their lack of homogeneity. This 
might suggest that treating all corporate claimants in the same way would be problematic or 
unjust. On the other, concerns about the inevitable arbitrariness of a dividing line, and about 
the specific lines that have been suggested, are strongly supported by the data.  
In Australia, one of the most significant criticisms of the law removing the right to sue from 
some corporations has been of its scope. In its evidence to the Joint Committee on the Draft 
Defamation Bill, a committee of the Law Council of Australia reported ‘a general consensus 
that the current corporations provision gives rise to serious anomalies, principally because of 
the arbitrary nature of the definition of “excluded corporations”’.215 The difficulties faced in 
Australia suggest that distinguishing corporations based on employee numbers, an approach 
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apparently endorsed by the Libel Reform Campaign,216 is not particularly effective. As the 
Joint Committee noted, ‘there may not be a link between the commercial power of a corporation 
and the number of people it employs.’217 
The proposals of the defendants in McLibel and Jameel v WSJ are also problematic. The 
increasing tendency for large companies to be organised in complex corporate groups means 
that the term ‘multinational corporation’ can rarely be applied to any individual legal person 
that would have capacity to sue in defamation.218 The defendants in Jameel v WSJ did not 
suggest how corporate claimants registered in the UK but forming part of a group owned 
ultimately by an overseas company should be dealt with.219 In one of the cases studied here, 
the judge admitted uncertainty as to the place of the claimant in a larger corporate group.220  
The Joint Committee’s observation that employee numbers do not necessarily reflect financial 
strength is also applicable to these other potential dividing lines, but using a direct measure of 
financial strength would also be problematic. In a futile attempt to investigate the ‘inequality 
of arms’ issue, I obtained from Companies House all available and relevant accounts filed by 
the corporations involved in the cases studied. This process revealed a number of issues with 
relying on a financial measure to differentiate between corporate claimants. Probably the most 
significant issue is the difficulty of finding an appropriate metric for a corporate claimant’s 
capacity to spend on litigation, but this is compounded by the inconsistent availability or 
standard of accounts, especially with regard to small or overseas-registered companies; and by 
the problems caused by corporate groups. 
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In the context of a proposed requirement to prove financial loss in order to establish liability, 
Mullis and Scott contended that ‘many companies may be unwilling to release financial 
information that would establish the extent of the loss’.221 If this is true, then basing the right 
to sue on a financial measure would mean that companies may be required to divulge 
confidential information, not even to establish liability or entitlement to damages, but merely 
to establish standing. If such evidence is not adduced, then the claimant may be put at a 
significant disadvantage.222 This may have a chilling effect of its own – on the willingness of 
corporate claimants to pursue even legitimate lawsuits. 
Parliament’s approach in the Defamation Act 2013 was to distinguish when a given claimant 
would or would not be subject to the section 1(2) restriction on the basis of whether or not it 
‘trades for profit’. The rationale for this distinction appears to have been to exclude charities 
from the ambit of the section, mainly on the basis that it would be more difficult for them to 
prove financial loss.223 There may also have been a perception that the chilling effect on 
freedom of speech was primarily, or wholly, caused by for-profit companies.224 However, the 
dividing line drawn in the 2013 Act presents its own problems.  
The most significant problem is that non-human claimants that would not be covered by section 
1(2) can, and do, abuse defamation laws. Mullis and Scott have suggested that, although ‘any 
line drawn will be artificial’, the Australian position (permitting defamation suits by non-profit 
organisations as well as companies with a small amount of employees) has ‘the merit of 
recognising that the capacity of a very small company, or even a small charity, to threaten a 
national media group is likely to be limited.’225 What Mullis and Scott did not mention, 
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however, and what Parliament failed to take into account, is the capacity of large charities, or 
other non-profit bodies, to chill expression. 
In fact, two of the more egregious examples of abusive lawsuits found in the data were brought 
by the University of Salford226 and the British Chiropractic Association,227 neither of which are 
for-profit organisations. These claimants would probably not be subject to the ‘serious financial 
loss’ requirement that was meant to stop this kind of abuse.228 It may be that Parliament’s 
decision not to extend the restriction in section 1(2) to non-profit bodies is already having 
negative consequences for debate on matters of public interest. Although the available 
information is limited, Private Eye recently reported a threat to sue made by the True and Fair 
Foundation, a registered charity, against City University London over a report produced by 
researchers at the Cass Business School.229 
Further, the widely expressed concern about the effect on charities of restricting or removing 
legal persons’ right to sue in defamation appears to be misplaced. Although non-profit bodies 
such as the Law Society do occasionally sue,230 charities seem rarely, if ever, to resort to 
defamation law. Even Gatley, noting the right of charities to sue, makes no reference to an 
English case in which this right has been utilised;231 and, as demonstrated by North London 
Central Mosque Trust, unincorporated charities have no standing to sue.232 Admittedly, the 
New South Wales branch of the RSPCA has sued in defamation since the Australian reforms 
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were introduced,233 but this kind of action appears to be exceptionally rare.234 If a fundamental 
aspect of the law of corporate defamation, and one that may allow future claimants such as the 
British Chiropractic Association to abuse the process of the courts, is based on the idea that 
charities might sometimes feel it necessary to seek a legal remedy for reputational harm, then 
future research testing whether or not this is actually the case would be extremely valuable.235 
Perhaps the only consistent and principled way in which to approach corporate defamation 
claimants is to recognise the one attribute that they all share – they are not human beings.236 
This fact alone does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that corporations should not be 
entitled to sue in defamation. It merely indicates that, whatever limitation it is considered 
appropriate to apply to corporate defamation claimants, it ought to apply to all of them. 
Assorted observations 
As previously mentioned, although the foregoing discussion relates to the main aims of this 
study, I did not want to ignore other interesting patterns that might emerge from the data. Two 
such patterns did, and they are addressed in this section. 
Unrepresented defendants 
The first is that almost all of the claimants that obtained judgment in their favour did so against 
defendants who were unrepresented or who represented themselves. The only exceptions were 
the defendants in Applause Store and Robins v Kordowski,237 both of whom were represented 
by counsel acting pro bono. In fact, the last time a corporate claimant obtained judgment against 
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a defendant represented by counsel that they had paid appears (after a non-exhaustive search) 
to have been over 15 years ago, in Takenaka (UK) Ltd v Frankl.238 This trend also seems to be 
continuing: the defendants in ReachLocal UK Ltd v Bennett,239 The Bussey Law Firm PC v 
Page,240 and of course Brett Wilson LLP v Person(s) Unknown,241 were all either unrepresented 
or self-represented. 
There are a number of ways of interpreting this observation. One is that the courts are 
insufficiently accommodating to defendants in person. This would be consistent with a study 
by Chris Hanretty, which found that the relative experience of counsel had an effect on the 
decisions of the House of Lords.242 If true, this may also be a factor in the ‘inequality of arms’ 
problem, in that some corporate claimants have better access to experienced counsel than 
individual defendants. Another interpretation might be that unrepresented defendants are less 
likely to be advised to settle their cases. Either of these explanations would be supported by 
the fact that only two defendants appearing in person were not found liable.243 The latter 
explanation would be consistent with the relative lack of media defendants in the cases studied. 
It should also be noted that of the ten unrepresented defendants that lost their cases, four refused 
to defend the claim at all.244 These cases may represent a ‘last chance’ for the claimant to obtain 
some vindication against an unresponsive critic,245 sometimes from the US, where English libel 
awards cannot be enforced.246 In Creative Resins, for example, the US-based defendant was 
                                                          
238 Takenaka (QB, 11 October 2000); [2001] EWCA Civ 348. 
239 [2014] EWHC 2161 (QB); [2014] EWHC 3405 (QB). 
240 [2015] EWHC 563 (QB). 
241 [2015] EWHC 2628 (QB). 
242 Chris Hanretty, ‘Haves and Have-Nots before the Law Lords’ (2014) 62 Political Studies 686. 
243 Case 21; Case 26. 
244 Case 16c [2]; Case 22 [5]; Case 33 [13]; Case 40b [9]. 
245 One way of accounting for this possibility is suggested above, at text to notes 183-4. 
246 SPEECH Act 28 USC 4101-5. 
43 
 
criticised for sending an ‘insulting’ letter challenging the claimant to ‘bring it on in the 
USA’.247  
Publication on a matter of public interest: a fault-based corporate defamation law? 
A further intriguing observation relates to the public interest in statements made about 
companies, an issue that has been highlighted by commentators as well as by the courts.248  
Although only nine cases involved discussion of the public interest in the statements 
complained of – probably due to the perceived difficulty and expense of pleading the Reynolds 
defence249 – in almost all of those cases, the judge found that the statement was on a matter of 
public interest. 
The only exceptions were two of the claims brought against Rick Kordowski. Both share an 
important feature: it was the publication of the statements complained of that was not in the 
public interest, rather than their subject matter. In other words, there was no case in which 
discussion of the activities of the corporate claimant was held not to be in the public interest. 
Rather, where public interest defences failed, they did so because of the manner or 
circumstances of the publication in question. In Awdry Bailey and Douglas, Tugendhat J held 
that there was ‘no public interest in the publication of the words complained of, which express 
the personal grievances of [the author]’.250 In Law Society, the claimants accepted that 
‘[i]nformed debate on [solicitors’ conduct] is clearly in the public interest’,251 and the court 
made its decision on the issue based on the need ‘to protect the public from the unjustifiable 
dissemination of false information about the suppliers of goods and services.’252 
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The conflation of falsity and public interest in Law Society is unfortunate – the Reynolds 
defence was, after all, designed to protect the publication of statements not proven to be true253 
– but this kind of confusion may well be solved by the simplified public interest defence in 
section 4 of the 2013 Act, which requires that: 
(a) the statement complained of was, or formed part of, a statement on a matter of 
public interest; and 
(b) the defendant reasonably believed that publishing the statement complained of was 
in the public interest. 
Although significant problems with the section have been identified,254 the clear separation of 
the two limbs of the defence will likely have the effect of preventing issues relating to falsity 
or to the circumstances of publication entering into the court’s decision on whether the 
statement was ‘on a matter of public interest’. Applying this test, it is difficult to see how the 
allegations made in the Kordowski cases would not have passed the first hurdle (although they 
would have failed at the second). 
Eric Descheemaeker has argued that the Reynolds defence ‘represents the importation of what 
is in essence a negligence standard’ into defamation law.255 The limited information available 
from this study suggests that, when it comes to corporate claimants, this fault standard will 
almost always apply – albeit that the onus will be on the defendant to prove that publication 
was not unreasonable. 
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Conclusion 
When this research was started, it was hoped that some of the many assertions and arguments 
made about corporate defamation claimants during the debates that led to the Defamation Act 
2013 could be tested. It was also hoped that, by looking in more detail at the landscape of 
litigation to which the 2013 Act was a reaction, it would be possible to assess the ‘serious 
financial loss’ requirement in section 1(2) from a fresh perspective. 
The findings, on balance, lend some degree of support to those who called for the complete 
removal of the corporate right to sue. The proportion of claims criticised in some way by the 
courts, and the number that were declared abusive, is surprising and concerning. The section 
1(2) requirement may make some difference, by allowing the courts to strike out weaker 
claims, but it will not solve all of the problems with corporate defamation claims. Moreover, 
the restriction of the scope of that requirement to for-profit companies is unjustified in 
principle, and seemingly ignores the potential for non-profit organisations to abuse defamation 
laws in order to stifle freedom of speech. 
Many of the claimants that were ultimately successful (even bearing in mind that some genuine 
claimants achieve ‘success’ through settlements without ever making it into a court room) 
could have relied on an alternative cause of action, or achieved vindication through a related 
claim brought by a human. Despite the flaws in the argument that companies usually have 
means of obtaining vindication other than a libel suit, it does appear to reflect the reality of 
those corporate defamation claims that are heard by the courts. When one considers this 
evidence in light of existing research on the chilling effect that corporate defamation laws have 
on expression, it seems difficult to justify the continued existence of the corporate right to sue. 
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